













We offer a theoretical extension and empirical analysis of home country autocracy as a key 
determinant for the internationalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Building on international 
business and international political economy theory, we argue that the pursuit of a mercantilist 
domestic agenda by autocratic governments is influential upon the magnitude and direction of state-
owned multinational enterprises’ (SOMNC) outward investment via acquisition. We conclude that 
autocratic home countries are ‘re-purposing’ SOEs to pursue international nationalist objectives – and 
that autocracies can do so more effectively and purposefully than democracies, by maintaining 
effective control over their SOMNCs. 
 







The unprecedented acceleration of internationalization by state-owned multinational companies 
(SOMNCs) (Kowalski & Perepechay, 2015) to date has received limited research attention. SOMNCs 
have been defined as “Legally independent firms with direct ownership by the state that have value 
adding activities outside its home country” (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 
2014, p. 925). For such firms to be deemed to exist “…a government entity should either own at least 
10 per cent of the capital, be the largest shareholder or benefit from a golden share” (UNCTAD, 2017, 
p. 30). What we know so far is that SOMNCs are hybrids combining attributes of both state-owned 
and the multinational company (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan, & Xu, 2015) whose behaviour is 
contingent upon the degree of state ownership (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013). State 
ownership also affects the way in which these firms internationalize (e.g., Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; 
Duanmu, 2014; Pan, et al., 2014). A current weakness of the SOMNC literature is that it spotlights 
Chinese SOEs (Bruton, et al., 2015) while giving only limited insight into the behaviour of SOMNCs 
as a more general phenomenon. Specifically, theoretical accounts for the existence of the SOMNC in 
the international sphere are scarce. At present it remains true to say that the “Logics that explain the 
internationalization of these firms and their transformation into SOMNCs is less obvious” (Cuervo-
Cazurra, et al., 2014, p. 925) than the well theorized reasoning underlying the domestic state 
ownership of production. The question of why SOMNCs exist and thrive internationally is 
particularly puzzling considering that, in the domestic sphere, the SOE as an organisational form has 
often proven to be productively inefficient compared with private firms (Megginson & Netter, 2001) 
but, at the same time, the returns on their international operations exceed the returns of many of their 
private counterparts (Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 2014).  
 An extensive body of international business (IB) research argues that it is the firm’s 
characteristics that primarily determine the where, how, and why of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
while the states’ regulatory activities over MNCs largely focus on the domestic market (i.e., inward 
FDI) (e.g., Brewer, 1993; Globerman & Shapiro, 1999). However, it has been observed that states 
intervene in the global economy for strategic reasons (Bremmer, 2009; Li, Cui & Lu, 2014; Luo, Xue, 
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& Han, 2010). We argue that the role of the home country is fundamental to our ability to understand 
the existence and behavior of SOMNCs. Drawing on the principles of international political economy 
(Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski, 1996; Jensen, 2008) that is concerned with how home 
countries pursue the development of their influence in the international policy space, we suggest that 
it is the home government’s motive to exercise power in the international sphere that drives certain 
home country governments to require, support, or allow their SOEs to internationalize. Specifically, 
the SOE is “re-purposed” to become a multinational actor linked to the priorities of home government 
(cf. Wu, 2015). SOMNCs may offer the scope to exercise power in the international sphere to 
governments that lack international institutional capital, so enabling the home economy to pursue 
national aims while economizing on the time and resource expenditure required to create conventional 
international institutional linkages.  
We further argue that this behaviour is not found uniformly across countries, instead it is 
determined by the nature of the political regime in the home country, specifically whether the regime 
is autocratic or democratic. From this basis, we hypothesise that SOMNCs from autocratic political 
regimes will exhibit more extensive internationalisation, a higher propensity to invest in other 
autocratic countries and to invest within the same industries abroad as their major domestic industries. 
Rather than being a general trend for all firms, we hypothesise that the effects will be stronger for 
these SOMNCs compared with SOMNCs from democratic regimes, and as compared with private 
firms from both autocratic and democratic countries. In this paper we capture SOE 
internationalization in the form of overseas acquisitions. We justify this from a theoretical standpoint 
as the dominant motivation for SOMNC expansion is to catch up and gain higher legitimacy via the 
most time-efficient mode (Deng, 2009; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). This translates into the 
category of strategic asset seeking international acquisitive behaviour. This expectation is supported 
by observation that the majority of SOMNC international activity is in form of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) (OECD, 2016; UNCTAD, 2017). We base our analysis on a global sample of 
SOE and private firm M&As completed between 1996 and 2015. The results largely confirm the 
hypotheses and show that the political regime of the home country plays a key role in international 
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acquisition propensity. The findings on SOMNC acquisitions between  autocratic economies 
resonates with earlier work on investments between countries with similar institutions (Shi, 
Hoskisson, & Zhang, 2016; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), while the findings on industry focus point towards 
the employment of a strategic approach by the autocratic government to strengthen its international 
position within a specific industry. Overall, these insights add to our understanding of why home 
country governments are disposed, and when they are most disposed, to promote SOEs 
internationalisation and their transformation into SOMNCs. 
The following sections present theorization and hypotheses development. This is followed by a 
methodology section and presentation of the results. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical 
and managerial implications, and opportunities for future research. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1. The global context of foreign investment and the rise of SOMNCs 
During the 1950s through 1980s, FDI was largely associated with privately-owned MNCs that 
exercised ownership advantages conferring some degree of monopoly or exploited large, efficient and 
resource-rich locations (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Vernon, 1971). Although SOEs existed primarily 
domestically, a number of these firms began to internationalize with the same aim as private 
enterprises pursuing the profit motive (Mazzolini, 1979). These SOMNCs operated mostly in 
resource-based sectors and were under strong government control with little management discretion 
(Mazzolini, 1979). Although the global diffusion of market liberalization and privatization 
significantly reduced the number of both domestic and internationally-active SOEs (He, Eden, & Hitt, 
2016; Megginson & Netter, 2001), partial privatization, for some, enhanced their entrepreneurial 
orientation and facilitated their progression to SOMNCs (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). Therefore, albeit 
with diminished importance, the presence of the state in the international economy persisted but 
exhibited no clear trend. 
SOEs experienced a second, more intense wave of internationalization post-2000 (Kowalski & 
Perepechay, 2015) driven by, e.g., increased foreign competition and the development of domestic 
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institutional environments – as well as the persistence of institutional voids (He, et al., 2016). Also, 
the financial crisis of 2007-08 led to a partial or full re-nationalization of large, privately-owned 
MNCs (São, 2010).  In addition, a number of SOEs from developing and emerging economies 
appeared as dominant outward investors in pursuit of strategic assets and capabilities (Deng, 2009). 
However, industrialised countries such as Norway and France have exhibited a considerable level of 
international state-ownership in industries such as energy, telecommunications, transport, and banking 
(Kowalski & Perepechay, 2015). Their  governments act as shareholders of the largest multinational 
companies (e.g., Volkswagen AG, Renault, Swisscom) through different channels (Musacchio & 
Lazzarini, 2012) and actively intervene to support their international activities (e.g., Financial Times, 
2016). 
 The second wave of SOE internationalization has differed in its scale and nature. Around 19 
percent of Forbes Global 500 companies in 2011 were state-owned (Kowalski, Büge, Sztajerowska, & 
Egeland, 2013; Kowalski & Perepechay, 2015), and most recent evidence suggests that the number 
now exceeds 22 percent (OECD, 2016). SOEs from high-technology industries (e.g., nuclear power 
generation, telecommunication equipment) and services (e.g., banking, construction) are 
internationalizing in greater numbers than ever before (Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 2014); in fact around 
70 percent of SOMNCs are service firms (UNCTAD, 2017). Furthermore, particular channels of 
government-backed investments in the global economy re-emerged and assumed a dominant role, 
such as Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) (Sauvant, Sachs, & Jongbloed, 2012).  
2.2. SOMNC internationalization and political regimes  
The internalization of SOMNCs, as a class, differs from private MNCs in terms of (1) objectives, 
as SOMNCs focus on a broader set of goals rather than profit-maximisation (He, et al., 2016); (2) 
resources, due of their preferential access to governmental financial and non-financial support 
(Buckley, et al., 2007; Duanmu, 2014); and (3) strategies, as they engage in risky (Pan, et al., 2014) 
explorative, rather than exploitative, investments to ensure long-term resource security (Bass & 
Chakrabarty, 2014). Also, the way in which they internationalize depends on the type of state 
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ownership, i.e., whether the SOE is centrally or locally controlled (Li, et al., 2014) and the 
institutional pressures they face in host countries as they adapt their entry strategies to reduce conflicts 
and enhance legitimacy (Meyer, et al., 2014). These contributions share the view that there is 
something distinctive about SOMNCs, but they do not provide a theoretical rationale for why these 
firms internationalize in the first place. Addressing this, Choudhury and Khanna (2014), building on 
Vernon (1979), offer evidence to show that SOEs, as a general proposition, are disposed to 
internationalize via managerial agency to achieve resource independence from domestic state actors. 
Putting aside firm-specific motivations, Cuervo-Cazurra, et al. (2014), suggest that SOMNCs may act 
as an indirect home country extraterritoriality mechanism for ideology transfer to comparably weaker 
host countries, or as an instrument to achieve specific political objectives. In doing so, the authors 
appeal for an investigation into the home country motivations for SOMNC internationalization. In 
response to this, we investigate the role of the home country regime as a rationale for the existence 
and behaviour of SOMNCs.  
Traditionally, SOEs exist as a means for the correction of domestic market distortions that cannot 
be addressed through other market-based mechanisms (e.g., Levy, 1987). However, Cuervo-Cazurra, 
et al. (2014, p. 928) argue that “The standard market imperfection logic of the SOE solving market 
imperfections at home to support the well-being of its citizens is less applicable when SOMNCs 
invest abroad.” This is because, when transposed into the international economy, the rationale for the 
existence of SOMNCs is not to raise global welfare, but rather the welfare of the home country. This 
can be described as a mercantilist agenda. The theory underlying mercantilism, historically argued 
with respect to trade, is that it generates domestic wealth through the growth of income and taxation 
revenue, and is controlled through the exercise of state power, in particular through the means of 
protectionism (Heckscher, 2013; Magnusson, 2002). Historically, expansion of this control 
internationally yielded access to resources for exploitation where the ultimate objective is to achieve 
long-run profit maximization at the enterprise level. By extension, where there is latent international 
market power available to the nation state through the internalisation of its enterprises, the 
internalization of these international market imperfections can be employed through the agency of the 
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SOMNC. This is the basis of our mercantilist argument underpinning the international expansion of 
SOMNCs particularly via the acquisition route. In effect, this combines economic nationalism with 
internalisation theory as, for example, exhibited when Japanese bureaucracy replaced market 
efficiency with alternative state-business objectives (Mirza, Buckley, Pass, & Sparkes, 1993).  
The mercantilist agenda employed via SOMNCs will depend on the political regime in a country. 
The political economy literature offers a largely dichotomous classification between autocratic and 
democratic political regimes (Alvarez, et al., 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010). A regime is 
autocratic if the chief executive or legislature are not appointed through universal popular election, if 
there is only one party, or if the incumbents unconstitutionally closed the legislature and rewrote the 
rules in their favour (Alvarez, et al., 1996). As particular business organizations from certain home 
countries are capable of internalizing government decisions (Luo, et al., 2010) we expect that 
SOMNCs, by extension from their domestic role, are charged with a set of tasks determined by the 
home government in the international domain. For autocratic home economies, political power, that is 
the acquisition, securing and use of power in relation to other social actors (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984) 
can more readily be exercised internationally via these SOMNCs precisely because they reside within 
the direct control of the state (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1966). This is because autocracies exhibit an 
increased ability to control SOMNC actions abroad, compared with democratic regimes and compared 
with government suasion over privately-owned MNCs. 
While managerial discretion is applicable to SOMNCs and SOEs (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014), 
on account of the presumption of monitoring costs that increase with geographical distance, we expect 
that SOMNC managers from autocratic countries will be under closer scrutiny, monitoring and control, 
compared with SOMNC managers from democratic countries. This is because centralization is a 
hallmark of autocracy, which is associated with lower levels of managerial autonomy (Li, et al., 2014). 
SOMNCs from autocratic countries are therefore likely to be controlled abroad more tightly as an 
extension of the argument that SOEs in autocratic economies are more tightly controlled than SOEs 
from democratic economies. Agency theory, as applied to SOMNCs in general, suggests a triple agency 
problem between the citizens of the home economy as owners, the politicians who determine the 
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objectives, and the managers who may seek to exercise managerial discretion (Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 
2014). However, under autocracy, domestic politicians are far more likely to be determining the 
objectives of SOMNCs compared with politicians under democracy (Easterly, 2014). Ramamurti has 
also observed that governments would claim that they had ‘“Ensured” managerial autonomy’ of SOEs 
(Ramamurti, 1991, p. 207) while heavily monitoring and exerting political control over foreign 
operations. Therefore, in autocracies, we argue that monitoring and control is amplified and, as a result, 
these economies will show a preference for the exercise of international state ownership as it is likely 
to be highly effective in pursuing a mercantilist agenda. It follows that autocratic country SOMNCs are 
more likely to pursue international expansion driven by the state’s objectives rather than managerial 
goals (Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1966). To conclude, these economies will exhibit a strong propensity for 
SOE internationalization, and the effect will be higher compared with SOEs from democratic home 
countries. The hypothesis is: 
H1: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms overseas than SOEs 
from democratic countries. 
These effects, we argue, will equally apply when autocratic country SOMNCs are compared with 
private firms. We expect that, when compared with private firms from democratic regimes, autocratic 
country SOMNCs are a more effective, centralised and controlled vehicle for the mercantilist agenda 
of the state. On the basis that private firms, even those from autocratic regimes, will enjoy a higher 
level of managerial autonomy than SOEs, we predict that the propensity to internationalize via 
acquisition to gain legitimacy, will be higher for SOMNCs because they are pursuing a mercantilist 
agenda, rather than private motives of profit maximization or managerial discretion: 
H1a, H1b: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms overseas 
compared with private firms from autocratic (H1a) and democratic (H1b) home countries. 
We also investigate the influence of the home country political regime on SOMNC location 
choice. Autocratic political regimes have been associated with political and policy uncertainty 
(Shubik, 1983), which is significant because management of risk due to these uncertainties is one of 
the primary considerations for multinationals when operating internationally (Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 
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1992; Ting, 1988). However, previous SOE studies found that SOEs locate in risky environments, 
attributing this to home country capital market distortions permitting preferential access to finance, 
enabling risky investments (Duanmu, 2012; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). Also, the institutional 
similarity argument suggests that firms from autocratic regimes will be familiar with state 
intervention, weak institutions, and low property rights protection (Morck, et al., 2008) and may, 
therefore, be attracted to other autocratic countries. Finally, because SOEs are able to leverage the 
political influence of their home government to lower expropriation hazards in uncertain 
environments (Duanmu, 2014), they are more likely to internationalize in these environments than 
their privately owned peers. Based on this, we suggest that autocratic economy SOEs will have a 
higher propensity to invest in autocratic host countries rather than SOEs from democratic countries 
and private firms: 
 H2: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms in other autocratic 
countries than SOEs from democratic countries.  
H2a, H2b: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms in other 
autocratic countries overseas compared with private firms from autocratic (H2a) and democratic 
(H2b) home countries. 
Building on Boddewyn and Brewer (1994), we expect that the industry to which the firm 
belongs will also exert a strong influence upon the business political priorities of the SOMNC in the 
international domain. Furthermore, the political economy view of international activity suggests that 
governments and, by extension, SOEs are motivated to integrate their resources, products and 
knowledge in globally coordinated networks (Alfaro & Charlton, 2009), which fosters their national 
competitiveness (Luo, et al., 2010). In fact, empirical research shows that SOMNCs are motivated to 
consolidate whole sectors on a global level, particularly ones they find of strategic importance not just 
domestically, but also internationally (e.g., petrochemicals, power generation, steel production, and 
telecommunications) (Bremmer, 2009). This suggests that autocratic home country SOMNCs will 
invest abroad in the same industries to strengthen their global intra-industry position, i.e., to take 
advantage of the industry specific gain of building up strategic industries and pursue a national 
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security agenda in preference to either a revenue or managerial discretion motive. Because of 
centralized control under autocracy, the power to pursue a mercantilist agenda of strategic national 
objectives within the same industry in the international sphere is more effectively executable for 
autocratic countries through their SOMNCs, in contrast to democratic country SOMNCs and 
privately-owned firms. In contrast, private firms will diversify their investments according to the 
profit motive (McDougal & Round, 1984; Rumelt, 1974). Hence, SOE internationalization is a means 
to increase the power of the autocratic home economy in the international marketplace focused within 
particular industries: 
H3: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms overseas in the 
same industry than SOEs from democratic countries. 
H3a, H3b: SOEs from autocratic home countries are more likely to acquire firms overseas in the 
same industry compared with private firms from autocratic (H3a) and democratic (H3b) home 
countries.   
3. Methodology 
Our analysis is based on data regarding the internationalization activities of SOEs and private 
firms. We rely on a comprehensive sample of cross-border M&As as indicators of firm 
internationalization, drawn from the widely adopted Thomson One database. Previous empirical 
evidence shows that SOMNC international activity materializes largely either as M&As or greenfield 
investment, with M&As accounting for the dominant share of foreign entry (OECD, 2016; UNCTAD, 
2017). Theory argues that a significant number of SOEs, particularly from developing countries, lag 
behind private MNCs in productivity and technological capabilities (Kikeri & Kolo, 2006) and, 
therefore, they are motivated to strategically acquire existing advanced resources abroad to catch-up, 
rather than develop new ones (Deng, 2009; Li, Li & Shapiro, 2012). Furthermore, SOEs are faced 
with more complex institutional pressures abroad and, in order to gain higher legitimacy at entry, have 
a preference for M&As compared to greenfield (Chan & Makino, 2007; Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Meyer, et al., 2014).  
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To test our main hypotheses regarding SOMNCs, we identify M&A deals completed by 
companies whose ultimate parent is a government, resulting in 11,022 domestic and cross-border 
M&A deals in total. We restrict the sample to completed cross-border M&As, resulting in 1,999 
observations. The earliest recorded SOE cross-border M&A was in 1981, but as the data for many of 
our independent variables are not available prior to 1996 and post 2015, we focus on M&As in the 
1996 to 2015 period. We further exclude the activities of extraterritorial bodies and organisations 
(e.g., IFC, EBRD, World Bank). This resulted with a final sample of 1,386 SOE M&A cases, 
representing 70 percent of all completed cross-border SOE M&As. Table 1 below shows the top 25 
acquirer (home) countries and target (host) countries as well as the acquirer names and industries. 
SOEs from Singapore, France, Qatar and Canada recorded the largest number of completed cross-
border M&A deals. The most frequent acquirer was Temasek Holdings, the national wealth fund of 
Singapore. The acquirers operate mostly in management, investment and banking activities as well as 
electronics, communications and energy sectors. To test our additional hypotheses based on a sample 
of privately-owned MNCs, we extract non-SOE cross-border M&As in the same period. Due to time 
limitations, we focus on non-SOE acquirers that operate in the top 25 countries listed in Table 1. This 
resulted with 136,146 completed cross-border non-SOE M&A instances. We replicate the collection 
and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables for this sample.   
- Table 1 about here – 
3.1. Dependent variables 
The full list of variables and data sources is provided in Table 2. As dependents, we employ a set 
of dichotomous choice variables used similarly in other studies modelling location or entry mode 
choices (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Duanmu, 2012; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014). To test the first 
set of hypotheses, we needed to capture the existence of an M&A event, as well as when an M&A 
does not occur. To that end, we adopt the dichotomous Cross-border M&A variable capturing the 
instance of an SOE (or private firm) M&A cross-border activity (value of 1) or a lack of one (value of 
0) for each of the possible country pairings in the database. To avoid the rare events (1,386 one and 
257,400 zero values, SOE sample) and small sample bias, we group the observations (Hosmer, 
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Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013; King & Zeng, 2001) in four different time periods: 1996-2000; 2001-
2005; 2006-2010; 2011-2015. If there was a cross-border SOE (or private firm) M&A activity 
completed in a specific time period for a specific country pair, the variable takes the value 1 and 0 
otherwise. If there was more than one instance of SOE (or private firm) M&A between particular 
country pairings in a particular period, we also code this with a value of 1 (Lu, et al., 2014). To test 
the second set of hypotheses, we estimate the Cross-border M&A Autocratic variable, capturing 
whether a cross-border M&A event (SOE or private firm) is directed towards autocratic economies. 
Based on our sample, we estimate the mean value of the composite Polity measure for the host 
countries (explained in detail below) for each cross-border M&A case and if a country’s score is 
below the mean, it is coded as autocratic and takes the value of 1. A value above the mean indicates a 
more democratic economy, taking the value of 0. We also use the mean to distinguish between SOEs 
and private firms from autocratic and democratic countries to compare the values of the main 
independents for different samples. As a robustness check, we also adopt alternative indicators of 
autocracy and develop measures using the same approach, namely the Political Constraint Index 
(POLCON), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) democracy measure, Heritage Foundation 
index of economic freedom and Freedom in the World index, discussed below and in the robustness 
checks section. To test the third set of hypotheses, we compare the industrial classification of both the 
acquirer (SOE and private firm) and the target company to develop our dependent variable, Cross-
border M&A Intra-industry. If, in a particular cross-border M&A case all four primary digit SIC 
codes of the target company and acquirer are the same, we assume the SOE (or private firm) to be 
investing in a comparable industry and the observation takes the value of 1 or 0 otherwise (Alfaro & 
Charlton, 2009). Our sample includes acquirers of different nature (e.g., international organizations, 
holding companies, manufacturers of motor vehicles, insurance companies), thus their behaviour and 
motivations to invest in particular industries may vary. For instance, SWFs invest to obtain short or 
long-term above-average returns rather than diversify or consolidate (Sauvant, et al., 2012). Data 
limitations (Table 1) does not permit us a more detailed analysis, but we account for the differences 
by including industry dummies and we explore the robustness of the average effect. 
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3.2. Independent variables 
For our main independent autocracy variable, the most used indicators are Polity IV measure of 
democracy, The Political Constraint Index (POLCON), Heritage Foundation Index of economic 
freedom, Freedom House civil and political liberties data and the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) democracy measure. Due to the comprehensiveness of various aspects of autocracy and the 
extensive country and year coverage, we use the Polity data as our main independent measure, also 
used in similar studies (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Li & Resnick, 2003). An 
additional advantage of the Polity data is that it provides information regarding autocracy and 
democracy in a single indicator, therefore facilitating analysis and interpretation (Marshall, Gurr, & 
Jaggers, 2017). Following previous practice, we use the Combined Polity Score measure which brings 
together composites of both autocracy and democracy into a single index ranging from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall, et al., 2017).  
To check for robustness of the main results, we employ other alternative measures. We use 
the Polity autocracy index, an indicator estimated as an eleven-point scale (0-10) composite 
accounting for the mixed qualities of distinct authority patterns in different countries (Marshall, et al., 
2017). A higher score is indicative of a more autocratic regime. In addition, we use the Political 
Constraint Index (POLCON) by Henisz (2000, 2002, 2006) which aims to capture the underlying 
political structures and policy credibility in a country. Also, we adopt the Heritage Foundation index 
of economic freedom which, by assessing an individual’s freedom to control his or her own labour 
and property, speaks to the level of democracy (Miller, Kim, Roberts, Riley, & Whiting, 2017) and 
has been used in previous studies (e.g., Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). Furthermore, we also 
use the Freedom in the World index of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2017) to 
measure the extent to which the political system is democratic, as in other studies (e.g., Berry, 
Guillén, & Hendi, 2014). Lastly, we use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data (PRS 
Group, 2017) focused on determining the country risks for international activities, but also speaking 
of the political environment in a country (e.g., Dikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010). The 
operationalization and results are discussed in the robustness checks section. 
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3.3. Control variables 
We control for host country characteristics found to be significant for foreign investment activities 
(Table 1), largely mirroring Buckley, Forsans, and Munjal (2012). Economies with growing demand 
and opportunities for profit generation via economies of scale and scope attract investors 
(Chakrabarti, 2001). Therefore, we control for the host country market size by using GDP and GDP 
per capita growth. Also, we account for host country resource endowments expected to attract 
investments as compensation for scarce supply in the domestic market (Dunning, 1980). The most 
widely used proxy is the Ratio of ore and metal exports to merchandise exports (e.g., Buckley, et al., 
2007; Buckley, et al., 2012). We also test for the significance of other natural resources (Agricultural 
land, Fisheries production, Forest area, Natural gas rents and Oil rents) and the quality of country 
infrastructure (Access to electricity). Since accessing advanced proprietary technology and other 
location-bound assets such as innovation and distribution networks are significant motivators for 
investment (Deng, 2003; Dunning, 1998), we use the number of Patent applications by residents as 
proxy (Buckley, et al., 2012). We also take into account the local Exchange rate against the US dollar 
because if the currency depreciates, local assets become cheaper in international markets (Blonigen, 
1997). Moreover, investors may be attracted to countries with high Government expenditure as these 
countries finance debts with inflow of foreign capital (Jensen, 2003). However, it may also exert a 
negative effect as high deficits are related to low long-run economic performance and unfavourable 
interest and exchange rates (Jensen, 2003). Furthermore, we measure openness of the host country by 
using Foreign trade and FDI inflows, showing the capability to attract investments (Buckley, et al., 
2012; Jensen, 2003).   
The literature, e.g., the CAGE model (Ghemawat, 2001), draws attention to the importance of 
distance between the home and host country. Although largely found to be insignificant (Tihanyi, 
Griffith, & Russell, 2005), we account for cultural distance by using Hofstede's indicators (Hofstede, 
1983) and, as specified (Shenkar, 2001), develop Euclidean distance indexes for all cultural 
dimensions. As a robustness check, we also use the GLOBE indicators comparable to the Hofstede 
dimensions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). To account for administrative 
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distance, we capture trade linkages in terms of membership of the same Trade bloc. Theory suggests 
that foreign investments are built upon initial trade-based market entries (Dunning, 1980; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). Also, studies showed that similarity in macroeconomic policies and near-uniformity of 
investment policy in particular promotes further investment (Buckley, et al., 2012). This is captured 
using the established G20 membership indicator. We control for Common colonial origin as a further 
indicator of administrative distance and institutional similarity (e.g., shared legal origins) (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). Geographic distance, reflecting the costs of servicing a market (Buckley 
& Casson, 1981), is proxied by the distance in miles between home and host capital cities. Finally, 
economic distance is captured using GDP indicators and resource endowments in the host country 
outlined above (Buckley, et al., 2012).  
 Since the data includes SOEs and private firms from a variety of home countries, we use the 
World Economic Outlook classification into two major groups: advanced and emerging and 
developing economies, i.e., Advanced country dummy. In models that permit firm-level variables, we 
control for the Industry of operation of the target and acquirer as well as Past cross-border M&As to 
account for previous M&A activity of the acquirer. Finally, we include year dummies. Following 
established practice, all continuous control variables are lagged one year. 
- Table 2 about here – 
3.4. Model 
We match the information regarding M&As including the target and acquirer by year and host 
country and collect independent variables by year for each host country as well as firm level 
information to create a panel data set. Considering our dependent variables are dichotomous, we 
follow established methodology and employ a logistic regression analysis (e.g., Alcacer & Chung, 
2007; Beamish & Kachra, 2004; Duanmu, 2012). This method enables us to model probabilities on a 
variety of conditions, in this case firm, home and host country characteristics. Since we use a different 
dependent variable to test each hypothesis, we employ different models that take the following 
general form: 
(1) Pr⁡(𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟⁡𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) = ⁡𝜙⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 )  
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where Pr⁡(𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟⁡𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡) indicates the probability of a SOE or private firm cross-
border M&A event in case of H1, or cross-border M&A autocratic event in H2, or cross-border M&A 
intra-industry event in H3, by a particular host country (H1) or firm (H2, H3) in a particular home 
country (H1) or target firm (H2 and H3) in particular year, while 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the explanatory 
variables vector and 𝛽  the relevant coefficient.  
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 3. None of the variables in the 
correlation matrix exceed the established rule of thumb of 0.8 (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). Table 4 
reports the results. The chi-square statistic probabilities show that all models are statistically 
significant (p=0.000). 
The first hypothesis predicts that SOEs from autocratic economies will have a higher propensity 
to acquire firms overseas. The results show that the coefficient for the combined polity score is 
negative and significant (p=0.000) which confirms our hypothesis (column 1, Table 4). Since logistic 
regression coefficients give the change in the log odds of the outcome for a unit increase in the 
predictor variable, the results suggest that for every one percentage increase in democracy of the 
home country regime, the log odds of acquiring a firm overseas decreases by 0.123. In addition, the 
average marginal effects suggest that an increase by one unit in the combined polity score results in a 
five percent decrease in probability of an SOE M&A. The effect is stronger compared with a 
restricted sample of SOEs from democratic countries (column 2, Table 4). Furthermore, H1a and H1b 
predict that SOEs from autocratic economies will have a higher propensity to acquire firms overseas 
than private firms from autocratic and democratic countries. Group comparisons between the 
coefficients and significance for SOE and private firm (columns 3 and 4, Table 4) suggest that the 
probability of autocratic SOEs to engage in cross-border M&As is higher than both private firm 
samples, assuming no difference in residual variation (Allison, 1999). This confirms the hypothesised 
effects. 
The second set of hypotheses predicts that SOEs from autocratic countries are more likely to 
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acquire firms in other autocratic countries overseas, and the effect is stronger compared with SOEs 
from democratic countries and private firms from both autocratic and democratic countries. The 
results in column 5 (Table 4) indicate a negative and significant (p=0.000) effect of the combined 
polity score on the dependent, showing that for every unit percentage increase in democracy of the 
home country regime, the log odds of acquiring a firm in an autocratic country overseas decreases by 
0.092. Average marginal effects show that one unit increase in the index decreases the probability for 
SOE M&As in autocratic host countries by more than seven percent. Although we find a negative and 
significant effect also for a sample of SOEs from democratic countries (column 6, Table 4), the 
indicator, in comparison, shows lower significance (p=0.005). Therefore, H2 is confirmed. 
Furthermore, the results for the sample of private firms from autocratic countries (column 5, Table 4), 
show no significant effect of the political regime on M&As overseas in autocratic countries 
(p=0.106), confirming H2a. Interestingly, we find a negative and significant effect of the political 
regime on M&As in autocratic countries overseas for the sample of private firms from democratic 
countries (p=0.000) (column 6, Table 4), which follows the finding for the sample of democratic 
SOEs. Overall, H2b is not supported and we conclude that democratic private firms will invest more 
in autocratic countries as the home political regime becomes more autocratic. 
The third set of hypotheses predicts that SOEs from autocratic countries are more likely to acquire 
firms overseas in the same industry, and the probability is higher compared with SOEs from 
democratic countries and private firms from both autocratic and democratic countries. The coefficient 
for the combined polity score shows that for every unit increase in democracy of the home country, 
the log odds of acquiring a firm overseas in a similar industry (versus acquiring a firm overseas in a 
different industry) decreases by 0.012 (p=0.080) (column 9, Table 4). Average marginal effects show 
that acquiring a firm in a similar industry decreases by 0.2 percent as democracy increases one unit. 
The effect for the sample of SOEs from democratic countries is comparable, but more significant 
(column 10, Table 4), therefore H3 is only partially supported. Finally, the results based on the two 
samples of private firms (columns 11 and 12, Table 4) show no significance of the combined polity 
score on the dependent, confirming H3a and H3b. 
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- Tables 3 and 4 about here – 
4.1. Robustness checks 
The post-estimation testing shows that our choice of predictors is meaningful with an acceptable 
level of tolerance, proving goodness-of-fit. To check the consistency of our results, we use the 
Autocracy index as alternative to our main independent. Confirming our main findings, the coefficient 
suggests that e.g., for every one unit percentage increase in autocracy of the home country regime, the 
log odds of acquiring a firm overseas increases by 0.292 (p=0.000) and the log odds of acquiring a 
firm in an autocratic country increases by 0.571 (p=0.000). Also, the results show that the log odds of 
acquiring a firm in a different industry decreases (p=0.012) as autocracy increases. As another 
alternative to the main independent, we test the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) used in other 
studies (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009), specifically the Political hazards measure. The indicator speaks to 
the feasibility of policy change by identifying the number of government branches with veto power, 
ranging from 0 (low policy stability) to 1 (high policy stability) (Henisz, 2000). As predicted by our 
hypotheses, SOEs from home countries with less stable policies are more likely to invest overseas, as 
well as invest in more autocratic countries, and the effect is stronger compared with SOEs form 
democratic countries and private firms. Similarly, we adopt the Heritage Foundation index of 
economic freedom used as a proxy for the strength of market-supporting institutions (Kane, Holmes, 
& O’Grady, 2007). The results support the first two sets of hypotheses, but the index is insignificant 
when the third set of hypotheses are tested. However, the operationalization of the index is on 
economic rather than political institutions, hence differences can be expected. Furthermore, we also 
use the Freedom in the World index of political rights as indicator of democracy, which supports our 
main findings. Lastly, we use the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), specifically two of the 
political risk components: Government Stability which assess the ability of political structures to 
implement programs and Democratic Accountability which measures the extent of the governments’ 
responsiveness to it people (PRS Group, 2017). Substituting our main independents with these 
indicators follows our main results. To conclude, with exception of the economic freedom index, 
running the models using these alternatives confirms our main findings and the results are robust to 
different specifications of the dependent variable. In addition, we check whether our main results hold 
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when adopting alternative indicators of cultural distance, the six measures developed by the GLOBE 
group comparable to the Hofstede dimensions (House, et al., 2004). Our main independents remain 
robust. 
Because our sample includes countries which may differ in the motives and strategies of 
internationalization, we further test how robust our results are when we differentiate the sample into 
emerging (and developing) and developed countries, based on the World Economic Outlook 
classification (also used as a control in the main models). The results confirm the main findings, 
evidencing robustness for different country groupings. Since our samples include acquirers of 
different nature with divergent motivations to invest in particular industries, we explore the sensitivity 
of the main results testing the third set of hypotheses by adopting a random split sample. Also, we run 
the models including only firms belonging to the first five most frequent SOE acquirer industries 
(Table 1). The results follow our main findings. 
Apart from country-level factors that we captured in the main models, previous studies found 
firm-level characteristics of the acquirer to significantly influence investment decisions. In addition to 
the basic information given by the Thompson database, we source firm level data from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Orbis database for the SOE sample by matching the acquirer’s name, city, country and 
industry. However, due to the scarcity of data available which would significantly reduce our number 
of observations (to less than 500), we excluded these from the main models. Size of the acquirer is 
considered as one of the main factors as larger firms will have greater ability for foreign acquisitions 
(e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). We capture firm size using total sales, total assets and number of 
employees, at the time of the M&A event. When testing H2 and H3 (which permit the inclusion of 
firm-level data), the coefficients and significance of the main independents follow the main results. 
Furthermore, studies suggest that SOEs differ in level of government ownership, they can be wholly-
owned, majority owned, minority owned or the state can appear as a strategic investor (Musacchio, 
Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015). Due to scarcity of the data available from Orbis (resulting with less than 
300 firm observations), particularly in case of SOEs from Russia, Malaysia and Middle Eastern 
countries and related limitations (only the most recent ownership data is available rather than 
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ownership at the time of the M&A event), we were unable to include it in the main models. However, 
the results based on the limited data showed that the second set of hypotheses hold when we control 
for the level of ownership. The coefficient of the indicator is positive as expected since higher state 
ownership levels would presumably make the role of the autocratic home country more pronounced. 
More research based on a more extensive dataset is needed to explore this further, however, this is 
beyond this study. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
5.1. Contributions 
The main aim of this paper is to offer a new theoretical approach and empirical evidence to 
contribute to understanding the internationalization process of SOMNCs. Prior studies showed that 
these hybrids of state ownership and private multinationals exhibit distinct internationalization 
behaviour (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014; Duanmu, 2014; Pan, et al., 2014) based on the type (Li, et al., 
2014) and level of state ownership (Inoue, et al., 2013). However, the literature offers only limited 
accounts of why SOEs internationalize. Choudhury and Khanna (2014) argue that SOEs expand 
abroad to achieve resource independence from domestic state agents, highlighting the disaggregated 
nature of state actors and a shift towards managerial discretion. In contrast, Cuervo-Cazurra, et al. 
(2014), by suggesting that SOMNCs may act as an instrument for ideology transfer and advancement 
of domestic political objectives, appeal for a more fine-grained investigation into the home country 
motivations for SOMNC internationalization. In response to this, we take the home country as a point 
of departure. 
By adopting insights from the international political economy literature, we suggest that SOEs 
internationalization may be driven by the home government’s motive to exercise power in the 
international sphere to raise the welfare of the home country, reflecting a mercantilist agenda. In the 
international domain, the existence of returns to the home economy that cannot be accessed, or fully 
accessed, by privately-owned MNCs, implies the existence of barriers that SOMNCs have been, and 
are being, re-purposed to address. In fact, this represents a new role for SOEs in the international 
domain to replace their diminished function of correcting putative domestic market imperfections or 
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running a planned economy. Furthermore, we argue that SOMNC predisposition to internationalize is 
not uniform across countries, rather it differs depending on the nature of the political regime in the 
home country. We argue, and empirically show, that autocratic home countries, characterised by the 
acquisition, securing and use of power in relation to other social actors (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984), 
generate SOMNCs with a strong propensity to internationalize through acquisition. This supports our 
predictions based on the motive to exercise state power in the international sphere via SOMNCs. This 
effect is stronger compared with SOMNCs from democratic countries and private firms from both 
political regime types. 
Moreover, we argue that the home country political regime can also explain how SOMNCs 
internationalise. Specifically, we find that autocratic home country SOMNCs have a high propensity 
to locate in autocratic host countries. Our empirical results build upon earlier studies that found SOEs 
in general to be less risk averse and better equipped to operate in institutionally weak environments 
(Duanmu, 2012; Morck, et al., 2008). Also, we hypothesise, and empirically confirm, that autocratic 
home country SOMNCs have a higher propensity to invest in the same or similar industry compared 
with private firms. This supports, but also goes further than, other studies that suggest MNCs are 
generally motivated to seek a strong global presence in an industry to foster their firm and country-
level competitiveness (Luo, et al., 2010) or opt for intra-industry investments in strategic sectors 
(Kowalski & Perepechay, 2015). 
Our argument contrasts with the standard model of internationalization, in which the firm’s 
international activities are primarily determined by economic and organizational, as opposed to 
political factors (Buckley & Casson, 1976) and conventional IB studies largely relying on the 
presumption that states’ regulatory activities over MNCs focus on inward FDI into the domestic 
market (Yeung, 1998). Rather, our arguments and findings stand in line with recent studies on the 
country-level political and institutional aspects of SOE internationalization (Cuervo-Cazurra, et al., 
2014; Hobdari, Gammeltoft, Li, & Meyer, 2017; Li, et al., 2014; Shi, et al., 2016), and to some extent 
with the industrial strategy literature emphasising that global competition is not only about firm 
rivalry, it also concerns competition between different states (Stopford, Strange, & Henley, 1991). 
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5.2. Managerial and policy relevance 
Our findings have managerial implications for SOMNCs and their overseas acquisition targets. 
On the evidence that SOE are re-purposed by their home country governments and are used to acquire 
firms in related industries abroad in order to support a domestic industrial policy, these firms may 
carry important weaknesses with them. When internationalizing, SOMNCs necessarily face, for 
example, a steepening human resources challenge, to staff operations abroad with domestic staff that 
may not have the skills, nor be able to develop them. It follows that internationalising SOEs must 
pursue a very well-designed strategy, otherwise performance abroad may well be insufficient to meet 
even the wider policy goals of the home government, quite apart from the business performance of the 
firm. Furthermore, international managers of re-purposed SOEs face the difficult task of developing 
competitive MNCs that are able to gain legitimacy in the host country while fulfilling the performance 
goals and industrial and domestic development objectives of the home country. 
Also, policy implications flow from our reasoning. As the SOE acquirer is likely to a carry home 
country mercantilist agenda, the host economy government will need to be mindful that the SOMNC 
business performance within the host may not realise host country aspirations for economic growth. 
And, at the target firm level, target firm managers and their shareholders who have knowledge of 
these wider home country goals, should consider demanding a significant premium for selling their 
company, as the acquirer is not merely addressing a commercial need but also a political goal. 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
Future research should focus both on alleviating some of the limitations of our empirical model and 
developing our findings further. Although we employ and test different alternative measures of 
political regimes, we employ an established, but simplified dichotomous distinction between two 
regime types and do not examine various categories for each of these types (for a recent discussion 
see Cheibub, et al., 2010) and how these could affect SOMNC strategies. Also, our global sample 
does not distinguish between characteristics and specifics of political regimes in different countries 
(e.g., fragmented authoritarianism in China). In addition, we do not consider the general quality (e.g., 
effectiveness) of the institutional environment of the home country, which may have an effect on 
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outward SOMNC activity, as in, e.g., Lu et al. (2014) for China. Our sample includes only M&As and 
excludes other possible entry modes. Although our theoretical reasoning suggests that acquisition is 
likely to be the first-choice foreign entry mode for the purpose of our study, and is supported by the 
observed prevalence of acquisition, it would be useful to test whether our results hold for a sample of 
greenfield or joint venture deals, and whether the home country political regime exerts any influence 
upon the mode of entry (Meyer, et al., 2009). Only limited information could be collected at the firm-
level data from a second database, to the extent that it did not allow us to integrate it into our model. 
We have also not been able to distinguish between different ownership types attaching to the target 
firm (Pan, et al., 2014) nor to inquire whether the SOE investors are at the level of the national or the 
local economy (Li, et al., 2014). Ultimately, it would be valuable to examine SOMNC performance 
post entry, at points following the elapse of time, to examine how far the mercantilist agenda 
translates into firm performance abroad. It remains an open question as to whether the highly mixed 
record of SOEs in achieving economic growth at home (Dick, 1974; Gerring, Bond, Barndt, & 
Moreno, 2005) translates into the international market, and whether any improved performance 
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Table 1 Top 25 acquirer and target countries where the acquirer’s ultimate owner is a SOMNC, by number of cross-border M&As 
No Acquirer Country n Target Country n Acquirer Name n Acquirer primary SIC code n 
1 Singapore  280 United States 139 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd (Singapore) 47 6722 (Management Investment Offices) 216 
2 France  67 United Kingdom 115 Government of Singapore Invest (Singapore) 38 6799 (Investors) 136 
3 Qatar 64 Australia 81 Canada Pension Plan Investment (Canada) 35 6000 (Banks) 76 
4 Canada  62 China  78 GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd (Singapore) 33 6282 (Investment Advice) 63 
5 Utd Arab Em 62 India 78 Qatar Holding LLC (Qatar) 19 4911 (Electric Services) 55 
6 China  53 Hong Kong 53 Statkraft SF (Norway) 18 4813 (Telephone Communications) 35 
7 Malaysia 48 Germany 49 Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (Utd Arab Em) 17 6211 (Security Brokers, Dealers, and Flotation 
Companies) 
34 
8 Germany 43 France  43 Singapore Telecommunication (Singapore) 17 499A (Cogeneration, alternative energy) 33 
9 Norway  42 Sweden  42 DEG-Deutsche Investitions (Germany) 16 6552 (Land Sub dividers and Developers) 31 
10 United States 40 Spain  30 Qatar Investment Authority (Qatar) 14 4812 (Radiotelephone Communications) 28 
11 Sweden  40 Canada  29 Bank VTB (Russian Fed) 11 999A (National government) 27 
12 United Kingdom 37 Indonesia 28 Caixa Geral de Depositos SA (Portugal) 11 1311 (Crude petroleum and natural gas) 25 
13 Hong Kong 36 Italy  27 Khazanah Nasional Bhd (Malaysia) 11 4512 (Air transportation) 22 
14 Netherlands 27 Malaysia 26 Emirates Telecommun Grp Co (Utd Arab Em) 10 8711 (Engineering services) 20 
15 New Zealand 24 Thailand  22 Sonatrach (Algeria) 10 4215 (Courier services) 14 
16 Ireland-Rep 24 Switzerland 21 OMX AB (Sweden) 9 999B (National government agency) 14 
17 South Korea 23 Japan  19 Vin & Sprit AB (Sweden) 9 4581 (Airports and airport terminal services) 14 
18 Luxembourg  22 Ukraine  19 LFB Biotechnologies SA (France) 8 6726 (Investment offices) 13 
19 Russian Fed 21 Brazil  18 Qatari Diar Real Estate Invest (Qatar) 8 1221 (Bituminous coal and lignite surface 
mining) 
12 
20 Italy 21 South Korea 18 Statkraft Norfund(SN)Power (Norway) 8 6719 (Offices of holding companies) 12 
21 Belgium  20 Turkey  18 Imatran Voima Oy (Finland)  7 7011 (Hotels and motels) 12 
22 Mauritius 19 Netherlands 16 Ornua (Irish Dairy Board) (Ireland-Rep) 7 1381 (Drilling oil and gas wells) 11 
23 Finland  18 Singapore 16 Korea Resources Corp (South Korea) 7 3731 (Ship building and repairing) 11 
24 Austria  16 Denmark 14 SNP Corp Ltd (Singapore) 7 6371 (Pension, health, and welfare funds) 11 
25 India  16 South Africa 14 Singapore Airlines Ltd (Singapore)  7 999D (Regional (state) agency) 10 
Author’s calculations based on Thompson One data from 1996 to 2015. n=1,386 
 
         






Table 2 Variables and data sources 
Variable (general) Proxy Data source 
Dependent variables   
Cross-border M&A (H1, H1a, H1b) 
Dichotomous, all possible country pairings engaging in cross-border (SOE 
or non-SOE) M&As in a specific five-year time period yes then 1 or no 0 
Thompson One 
Cross-border M&A Autocratic (H2, H2a, 
H2b) 
Dichotomous, if target country is autocratic then 1 if not then 0 (using the 
mean value of the Combined Polity Score) 
Polity IV database (Robustness checks: Political Constraint Index (POLCON); Heritage 
Foundation index of economic freedom; Freedom in the World index; International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)) 
Cross-border M&A Intra-industry (H3, 
H3a, H3b) 
Dichotomous, if all four primary SIC codes of the target and acquirer are 
the same then value of 1, if not 0 
Thompson One 
Independent variables   
Autocracy 
(home/acquirer country) 
Combined Polity Score (composite of autocracy and democracy) 
Polity IV database (Robustness checks: Polity Autocracy index; Political Constraint Index 
(POLCON); Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom; Freedom in the World 
index; International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)) 
Control variables   
 Host (target) 
country  
Market size 
GDP (US$ constant market prices, deflated by the base year) 
World Bank Development Indicators 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
Resource endowments 
 
Ratio of ore and metal exports to merchandise exports (%) 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Agricultural land (% of land area) 
Fisheries production (metric tons) 
Forest area (% of land area) 
Natural gas rents (% of GDP) 
Oil rents (% of GDP) 
Access to electricity (% of population) 
Patent registrations (by residents, country and year) 
Economy, trade and 
FDI 
Annual average exchange rate (local currency per US$) 
World Bank Development Indicators 
Government expenditure (% of GDP) 
Ratio of foreign trade to GDP (% of GDP) 
FDI inflows (% of GDP) 





Hofstede (Robustness checks: GLOBE) 
Individualism/Collectivism distance 
Masculinity/Femininity distance 
Uncertainty Avoidance distance 




Membership of the same trade bloc, dichotomous, if both home and host 
countries members of the same Regional Trade Agreement then 0, if not 1 
World Trade Organisation 
G20 membership, dichotomous, if both home and host countries members 
of G-20 summit then 0, if not 1 
www.g20.org 
Common colonial origin, dichotomous, if both home and host countries 
share a colonial origin (in the past 200 years) then 0, if not 1 (including 
the 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories) 




Distance between the capitals of the host and home country www.geobytes.com 
Home country Advanced dummy 
Dichotomous country classification into two major groups: advanced 
economies (1) and emerging and developing economies (0) 








Dichotomous, if the firm engaged in cross-border M&As previously then 
1, if not 0 
Thompson One 
Industry (acquirer) Industry of operation (dummies) 
Industry (target) Industry of operation (dummies) 





Table 3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1 Cross-border M&As .01 .12 1                             
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8 Agricultural land 43.35 20.59 .02* 
-
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30 Past cross-border M&As .49 .50 - -.05 .11* 
-
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.11* .02 -.04 -.05 -.00 .02 .09* .10* .10* 







Table 4 Results of logistic regressions 
Variables Cross-border M&A, yes/no Cross-border M&A Autocratic, yes/no Cross-border M&A Intra-industry, yes/no 
 H1 H1a H1b H2 H2a H2b H3 H3a H3b 



















 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Combined Polity Score -0.123*** -0.042 0.258*** -0.310** -0.092*** -0.601*** -0.019 -1.179*** -0.012* -1.227*** 0.001 -0.036 
 (0.014) (0.075) (0.039) (0.038) (0.029) (0.566) (0.012) (0.054) (0.021) (0.380) (0.006) (0.028) 
GDP 0.025* 0.003 0.040* -0.032*** -0.502* -0.902** -0.434*** -0.235*** -0.124 -0.010 -0.083 0.037** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.004) (0.276) (0.399) (0.123) (0.033) (0.157) (0.238) (0.057) (0.015) 
GDP per capita growth -0.104*** -0.087*** -0.037 -0.026 0.115** 0.105 0.117*** 0.031*** 0.018 -0.006 0.011 0.003 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.071) (0.017) (0.052) (0.092) (0.027) (0.006) (0.034) (0.052) (0.011) (0.003) 
Ore and metal exports 0.013** 0.017** -0.019 0.003 -0.083*** -0.104*** -0.065*** -0.079*** -0.021* -0.018 0.005 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.003) (0.020) (0.028) (0.014) (0.003) (0.011) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001) 
Agricultural land 0.011* 0.007 0.014 0.007*** 0.001 -0.044** -0.004 0.002 0.014 0.008 -0.001 -0.003*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.014) (0.017) (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) 
Fisheries production 0.099** 0.064 0.493*** 0.056*** 0.359*** 0.076 0.274*** 0.258*** -0.059 0.044 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.083) (0.019) (0.096) (0.136) (0.048) (0.012) (0.064) (0.081) (0.025) (0.006) 
Forest area -0.003 -0.010* 0.011 0.002 0.036** 0.001 0.012* 0.036*** 0.010 0.009 0.001 -0.002*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) 
Natural gas rents 0.166 0.173 -0.121 0.132*** -0.383 -2.416*** -0.854*** -0.793*** -0.302 -0.407 -0.006 0.028 
 (0.108) (0.119) (0.156) (0.045) (0.387) (0.800) (0.265) (0.050) (0.254) (0.414) (0.075) (0.017) 
Oil rents -0.076** -0.070* -0.040 -0.062*** 0.380*** 0.873*** 0.775*** 0.642*** -0.023 -0.040 0.002 -0.033*** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.044) (0.011) (0.112) (0.225) (0.083) (0.016) (0.055) (0.061) (0.026) (0.006) 
Access to electricity -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 0.013*** 0.125*** 0.098*** 0.144*** 0.112*** 0.048*** 0.061*** -0.004 -0.004*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.004) (0.026) (0.031) (0.012) (0.004) (0.017) (0.023) (0.005) (0.002) 
Patent applications 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.176** 0.098*** -0.214 -0.065 -0.080 -0.589*** -0.207** -0.339** 0.099*** 0.021** 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.071) (0.019) (0.159) (0.251) (0.067) (0.020) (0.103) (0.159) (0.032) (0.010) 
Exchange rate 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.085 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.095) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.596) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government expenditure -0.042** -0.029 -0.035 0.024** -0.322*** -0.139* -0.331*** -0.070*** -0.048* -0.063 0.003 0.015*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.041) (0.011) (0.054) (0.082) (0.023) (0.008) (0.026) (0.040) (0.009) (0.003) 
Foreign trade -0.000 -0.000 -0.009*** -0.000 0.003 -0.018** 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.005* -0.000 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
FDI inflows 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.062 0.028** 0.132*** 0.205*** -0.003 0.037*** -0.011 -0.017 0.007 -0.003*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.060) (0.0135) (0.043) (0.071) (0.014) (0.008) (0.022) (0.028) (0.005) (0.001) 
Power distance 0.004 0.005 0.080*** 0.007*** 0.029** 0.041*** -0.058*** 0.071*** -0.007 -0.015 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.001) 
Individualism/Collectivism 
distance 
0.001 0.002 -0.014 0.011*** -0.044*** 0.047*** -0.070*** 0.085*** -0.000 -0.001 0.005*** -0.002*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) 
Masculinity/Femininity 
distance 
-0.021*** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.009*** -0.008 0.006 -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.001* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011) (0.015) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
distance 
-0.013*** -0.016*** 0.005 -0.005*** -0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.000 -0.001 -0.014 0.002 0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.017) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
Long/Short term 
orientation distance 
-0.007** -0.008** -0.007 -0.006*** -0.001 0.017 0.002 0.023*** -0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) 
Indulgence/Restraint 
distance 
-0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.045*** 0.044*** -0.039*** -0.001 0.006 -0.003 0.004*** 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.017) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) 
Trade bloc 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.050** -0.453 0.260 -0.059 0.439*** 0.696*** 1.017** 0.064 0.123*** 
 (0.865) (0.070) (0.250) (0.047) (0.385) (0.541) (0.189) (0.038) (0.270) (0.417) (0.089) (0.019) 
G20 membership -0.071 0.333* 5.143*** 0.378*** -0.862** -1.204** -0.698*** -1.868*** 
-
0.853*** 
-0.651* 0.207** 0.038* 
 (0.128) (0.180) (0.429) (0.086) (0.396) (0.516) (0.170) (0.058) (0.250) (0.350) (0.083) (0.022) 
Common colonial origin 0.002 0.061 0.034 0.002 -0.742 -2.127*** -0.734* 1.263*** 0.468 0.509 0.241 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.498) (0.740) (0.375) (0.128) (0.339) (0.410) (0.157) (0.025) 
Geographic distance 0.048 0.005 0.056 0.012 0.569*** 0.299 0.003 0.035 -0.124 -0.191 0.061 0.001 
 (0.169) (0.001) (0.084) (0.013) (0.171) (0.265) (0.004) (0.020) (0.104) (0.144) (0.009) (0.011) 
Advanced dummy 2.277*** 1.533*** 4.395*** 2.991*** 0.394 0.066 -0.521*** 1.133*** -0.007 1.360** 0.024 0.316*** 
 (0.193) (0.202) (0.371) (0.119) (0.427) (0.87) (0.193) (0.117) (0.295) (0.621) (0.091) (0.065) 
Past cross-border M&As - - - - -0.084 -0.299 -0.000 0.033 -0.200 -0.181 -0.000 0.201 
     (0.284) (0.430) (0.001) (0.567) (0.196) (0.250) (0.001) (0.781) 
Industry (acquirer) - - - - Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry (target) - - - - Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 






7.247 -9.075*** -9.521*** -3.087 7.108 0.848 0.597 
 (1.179) (1.480) (2.465) (0.683) (4.356) (7.843) (1.535) (0.940) (2.471) (4.444) (0.918) (0.401) 
Wald chi2 348.68 270.25 271.67 1274.71 284.20 153.65 3377.33 18469.24 136.67 97.54 389.99 1891.77 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.12 0.47 0.21 0.51 0.51 0.77 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.02 
N 7,803 6,897 906 6,897 902 514 9,368 104,032 902 514 9,368 104,032 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. The number of observations across the models differs depending on the dependent variable and the sample (SOE M&As, private firm autocratic and 
democratic M&As samples) and was reduced due to missing observations. * Significant at p < 0.10; ** significant at p < 0.05; *** significant at p < 0.00
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